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CAUGHT BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS: 
ALASKA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA 
AMIDST THE NEW COLD WAR 
Sam Karson* 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, Alaska has developed an increasingly robust economic 
relationship with China. China is the largest foreign buyer of Alaskan goods 
and China continues to invest in Alaska and promote Alaskan tourism. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. federal government’s relationship with China has 
deteriorated over concerns that China poses a danger to U.S. national security. 
As the U.S. federal government continues to scrutinize Chinese investment 
and trade with the United States, Alaska’s economic relationship with China 
increasingly hangs in the balance. Alaska’s relationship with China thus joins 
a long history of economic ties between states and foreign nations that pose 
conflicts of interest for the U.S. federal government. Beginning with the 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution and leading up to the present, the states 
have staked out a role as advocates on behalf of their citizens in promoting 
economic ties with foreign nations. This Note argues that the anti-
commandeering doctrine provides constitutional protection for Alaska’s 
promotion of its economic relationship with China from interference by the 
U.S. federal government. While the federal government may itself regulate 
commerce between Alaska and China, the federal government may not muzzle 
the Alaska state government and prevent it from promoting commerce with 
China. While this state of play might seem like a hollow victory for Alaska, the 
anti-commandeering doctrine requires the federal government to take action 
itself — rather than coerce Alaska to take action — and thus forces the federal 
government to expend greater political capital in passing a law or regulation. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine thus properly apportions political 
accountability among the state and federal governments and makes federal 
intervention less likely. 
 
Copyright © 2019 by Sam Karson. 
    * J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2019; B.A. Government 
& Legal Studies, Bowdoin College, 2014. The Author would like to thank the 
Alaska Law Review staff for their tireless work and the Alaska Bar Association for 
the opportunity to publish this Note. All mistakes are my own. 
KARSON - V6.1 (FINAL VERSION) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2019  11:34 AM 
48 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 6, 2018, then-Governor of Alaska Bill Walker celebrated a 
successful trade mission to China, where delegates from Alaska attended 
more than twenty-five meetings across China over ten days.1 Governor 
Walker stated, 
I was honored to lead this trade mission and watch so many 
Alaskan leaders work to grow their businesses and bring jobs 
home. Perhaps what impressed me the most was the consistent 
push to build an Alaska brand that makes the world realize the 
quality of our fresh seafood, the natural beauty of our state, and 
our many opportunities for economic growth.2 
This trade mission was part of Governor Walker’s “Opportunity 
Alaska” initiative, led by Alaska’s Office of International Trade, which 
seeks to grow Alaska’s export and investment relationship with its largest 
trading partner, China.3 Governor Walker stated, 
Throughout 2017, the State of Alaska made significant inroads 
with [Chinese] companies and government officials, including 
meeting with President Xi Jinping and Cabinet-level officials.4 
Alaska’s relationship with China, however, comes with 
complications. On August 16, 2018, only two months after the Alaska 
delegation’s visit to China, cybersecurity firm Recorded Future5 released 
a report detailing a Chinese government-linked hacking group’s attempts 
to penetrate computer servers belonging to the Alaska state government.6 
 
 1.  Opportunity Alaska: China Trade Mission Delegates Return Home, BILL 
WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (June 6, 2018), https://gov.alaska.gov/ 
newsroom/2018/06/opportunity-alaska-china-trade-mission-delegates-return-
home/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20181018063905/https://gov.alaska.gov 
/newsroom/2018/06/opportunity-alaska-china-trade-mission-delegates-return-
home/]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Governor Bill Walker: Opportunity Alaska China Trade Mission 2018, BILL 
WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, https://gov.alaska.gov/services/office-of-
international-trade/alaska-china-trade-mission/ [https://web.archive.org/web 
/20181020084928/https://gov.alaska.gov/services/office-of-international-
trade/alaska-china-trade-mission/] (last visited Dec. 16, 2018). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Recorded Future is a private cyber threat intelligence firm that uses 
proprietary software to gather and analyze vast amounts of data to provide 
insights about cyber threats to their clients. Threat Intelligence Machine, RECORDED 
FUTURE, https://www.recordedfuture.com/technology/ (last visited Dec. 15, 
2018). 
 6.  Christopher Bing & Jack Stubbs, Chinese Hackers Targeted U.S. Firms, 
Government After Trade Mission: Researchers, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2018, 8:06 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-cyber/chinese-hackers-
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According to Recorded Future, these attempts occurred in the weeks 
before and after Governor Walker’s trade mission to China.7 Recorded 
Future submitted their report to the FBI, but the Alaska Governor’s Office 
seemed unconcerned: “[E]veryday [sic], the State of Alaska, like most 
state governments, has anonymous activity on the perimeter of our 
networks that amounts to someone checking if the door is locked. The 
activity referenced here is not unique.”8 
This incident nevertheless underscores the complex and, at times, 
adversarial relationship between China and the United States and the 
conflicts of interest that can arise between the U.S. federal government 
and the states. Alaska may decide that some Chinese hacking is 
acceptable if challenging it would threaten the state’s robust economic 
relationship with China. The U.S. federal government, however, may take 
the position that Chinese hacking is an unacceptable national security 
threat subject to criminal indictment9 and diplomatic repercussions.10 
Indeed, recent trends in U.S.-China relations have stoked tensions 
between the two superpowers with increased Chinese hacking of 
American entities, increased economic espionage by Chinese agents in the 
United States, and a “trade war” involving tariffs and export controls.11 
On a broader strategic level, China has been acquiring American 
technology and other American businesses at a rapid rate to advance its 
domestic industries as part of its “Made in China 2025” plan.12 There is 
also a growing consensus that China is using trade and investment to 
“manipulate financial networks, political processes, and public debate” in 
the United States and elsewhere.13 Thus, while Alaska and its citizens may 
welcome the money and jobs that economic engagement with China 
 
targeted-u-s-firms-govt-after-trade-mission-researchers-idUSKBN1L11D2. 
Recorded Future uncovered these attempts to hack Alaska state government 
servers as part of Recorded Future’s own research into Chinese government 
hacking. Sanil Chohan et al., Chinese Cyberespionage Originating from Tsinghua 
University Infrastructure, RECORDED FUTURE (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.record 
edfuture.com/chinese-cyberespionage-operations/. Recorded Future assessed 
that China’s attempts to hack Alaska government servers after the trade 
delegation’s visit “was likely an attempt to gain insight into the Alaskan 
perspective on the trip and strategic advantage in the post-visit negotiations.” Id. 
Recorded Future found that China had also attempted to conduct cyberespionage 
on organizations in Kenya, Brazil, and Mongolia related to potential Chinese 
investment in those countries. Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See infra Section II.B. 
 10.  See infra Section II.B. 
 11.  See infra Section II.B. 
 12.  Charles Edel, The China Challenge, THE AMERICAN INTEREST (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/24/the-china-challenge/. 
 13.  Id. 
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brings, the U.S. federal government has legitimate reasons to worry about 
Alaska’s growing relationship with China. 
Alaska’s growing relationship with China is by no means the first to 
raise concerns about conflicts of interest with the U.S. federal 
government, nor is it a state’s first foray into foreign affairs.14 In fact, 
leading up to the U.S. Constitution’s ratification, the colonies were 
extensively involved in foreign commerce and continued to engage in 
foreign commerce for some time after ratification.15 Over the course of the 
19th century, the Supreme Court, the President, and Congress fought to 
wrest control of foreign commerce from the states and, by World War II 
and the Cold War, foreign commerce was largely within the exclusive 
realm of the federal government.16 
Nevertheless, since North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges’s trade 
mission to Europe in 1959, states have begun to reclaim their roles in 
foreign commerce.17 Over the last sixty years, states have increasingly 
entered into cooperative agreements with foreign nations and sub-
national units, adopted international standards, led trade delegations, 
opened overseas offices, pursued foreign direct investment, attracted 
multinational corporations, encouraged the export of goods overseas, and 
established sister-city and other relationships with foreign cities, among 
other functions.18 
While the states have recently become more active in foreign 
commerce, the federal government nonetheless retains several 
constitutional and statutory powers to control foreign commerce.19 
Indeed, there is a robust debate as to the states’ proper place in foreign 
commerce and the extent to which the states may constitutionally engage 
in foreign relations if at all.20 Some have argued that the Constitution 
entirely excludes the states from participation in foreign commerce and 
 
 14.  See generally EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1998). 
 15.  Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant 
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1198–1205 (2000). 
 16.  Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1227–
28 (1999). 
 17.  Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 749 
(2010). 
 18.  MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM 
38–45 (2016). 
 19.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 20.  See id; see generally Ryan Baasch & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Congress 
and the Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 115 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2016); 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the ‘One-Voice’ Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 
VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001); Hollis, supra note 17; Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the 
States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999); Spiro, supra note 16; Swaine, supra note 15. 
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foreign affairs.21 Other scholars point out, however, that many of the 
states’ core regulatory activities may implicate foreign commerce.22 These 
scholars argue that while the states may participate in foreign commerce, 
Congress may exclude the states from foreign commerce through 
preemption.23 Nevertheless, scholars generally agree that state 
participation in foreign commerce, if allowed at all, is subject to federal 
regulation.24 
Federal regulation of state participation in foreign commerce may, 
however, conflict with the anti-commandeering doctrine. First developed 
in New York v. United States25 and Printz v. United States,26 the anti-
commandeering doctrine dictates that “Congress may not simply 
commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”27 In 2018, the 
Court reaffirmed this doctrine, explaining that Congress may not issue “a 
direct command to the States.”28 The anti-commandeering doctrine 
protects the traditional balance of power between the federal government 
and the states, ensuring that each level of government is held accountable 
for its actions.29 
This Note will argue that, while Congress may regulate foreign 
commerce itself under the Foreign Commerce Clause, the anti-
commandeering doctrine prevents Congress from prohibiting the Alaska 
state government’s promotion of its economic relationship with China.30 
 
 21.  See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 572 (1840) (Taney, C.J., plurality 
opinion) (“[T]he framers of the Constitution . . . anxiously desired to cut off all 
connection or communication between a state and a foreign power . . . .”). 
 22.  See, e.g., ERNEST A. YOUNG, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 4–11 (2018) (on file with author) (describing the influence that state policies 
on taxation, criminal law enforcement, and immigration law can have on foreign 
affairs). 
 23.  See Cleveland, supra note 20, at 975. 
 24.  As two scholars point out: 
No one questions . . . Congress’s authority to preempt state initiatives by 
legislating within the scope of its Article I powers, including those 
foreign affairs powers it shares with the president. Nor does anyone 
question executive authority to preempt state measures by the exercise 
of those constitutional powers vested exclusively in the president by 
Article II. 
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 18, at xxi. 
 25.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 26.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 27.  New York, 505 U.S. at 161. 
 28.  Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018). Murphy was the first major 
Supreme Court ruling to rely on the anti-commandeering doctrine since Reno v. 
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 29.  Id. at 1478. 
 30.  This Note defines Alaska’s economic relationship with China to include 
conducting trade missions to China, promoting Alaska exports to China, and 
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To do so would force Alaska to implement the federal government’s 
foreign policy towards China in violation of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine. This argument stakes out a constitutionally protected role for 
states in foreign commerce based on a careful study of the historical and 
current roles of states in foreign commerce, which have largely been 
ignored by federalism scholars,31 and a recently reaffirmed anti-
commandeering doctrine.32 
This Note will proceed in three parts. Section II explains Alaska’s 
economic relationship with China and the conflicts of interest it poses 
with the U.S. federal government. Section III describes the historical 
background of the states’ participation in foreign commerce against 
which the China-Alaska relationship is set. Section IV argues that the anti-
commandeering doctrine protects Alaska’s promotion of its economic 
relationship with China from the U.S. federal government’s power to 
regulate foreign commerce. Because the Trump administration’s 
relationship with China is constantly fluctuating,33 an examination of the 
political and legal status of Alaska’s own relationship with China is even 
more important. 
II. THE CHINA CONNECTION: ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS 
Alaska and China have developed a robust trade, investment, and 
tourism relationship.34 This relationship is complicated by the U.S. federal 
government’s increasing regulation of Chinese trade and investment as a 
response to perceived Chinese threats to U.S. national security. This 
 
promoting Chinese investment and tourism in Alaska. 
 31.  See, e.g., Baasch & Prakash, supra note 20, at 50 (“The states should stand 
deaf and mute in the foreign arena because they lack the expertise and knowledge 
necessary to engage in that arena. States lack a cadre of resident international 
specialists (State Department bureaucrats) and do not have the benefit of semi-
permanent officials stationed abroad (ambassadors and their extensive retinue of 
experts)”). As this Note explains, the states do in fact have domestic and overseas 
offices and officials dedicated to foreign commerce. See infra Section III.C. 
 32.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1461. 
 33.  Matthew Lee & Rob Gillies, US, Canada Look to Ease Strains Amid 3-Way 
Spat with China, AP NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c8cab06b 
7fd94498a7b8b06b2c8ab8a7; Joe McDonald, China Suspends Tariff Hikes on U.S. 
Cars, Auto Parts, AP NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/ 
87669a6f4b70486fb48c3f5134d18d72; Christopher Bing, U.S. to Reveal Charges 
Against Chinese Hackers: Sources, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2018, 3:49 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-china/u-s-to-reveal-charges-
against-chinese-hackers-sources-idUSKBN1O62D8. 
 34.  See THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, ALASKA’S EXPORTS TO CHINA 1 
(2018), https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/uscbc_alaska_state 
_report_2018_0.pdf. 
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Section will first discuss Alaska’s economic relationship with China, 
including the Alaska state government’s efforts to promote the state’s 
economic relationship with China. This Section will then discuss Chinese 
threats to U.S. national security and how the federal government has 
responded by regulating Chinese trade and investment. 
A. Alaska’s Economic Relationship with China 
China was Alaska’s largest trading partner in 2017, during which 
Alaska exported $1.3 billion worth of goods and $135 million worth of 
services to China.35 Alaska’s exports to China represented over a quarter 
of Alaska’s overall exports in 2017 and included $860 million of marine 
products, $356 million of mineral ore, $49 million of oil and gas, and $48 
million of forest products, among other exports.36 By comparison, Alaska 
exported $813 million of goods to Japan, $705 million of goods to Canada, 
$669 million of goods to South Korea, and $182 million of goods to 
Germany.37 Since 2008, Alaska’s exports to China have grown 81%, while 
Alaska’s collective exports to the rest of the world grew an average of only 
28%.38 In 2016, Alaskan exports to China supported 6100 American jobs.39 
The Alaska state government has gone to great lengths to promote 
its economic relationship with China, including exports, investment, and 
tourism. On April 8, 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stopped in 
Anchorage to meet with Alaska Governor Bill Walker on his way home 
from meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in 
Florida.40 In Anchorage, the two leaders discussed Alaskan exports, 
including seafood and oil and gas, Alaska’s service as a hub for air cargo, 
Chinese tourism in Alaska, and a liquefied natural gas export project that 
would connect Alaska and China.41 Following the meeting, Governor 
Walker stated that “[President Xi] felt that as a result of his coming to 
Alaska, we will see an uptick of tourism from China.”42 In 2016, Alaska 
received approximately 1.2 million Chinese tourists, many of whom 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Jeannette Lee Falsey, A Surprise Guest: Chinese President Makes Anchorage 
Stopover, Meets Gov. Walker and Takes in Some Sights, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 
8, 2017), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2017/04/07/chinese-president-
makes-surprise-visit-to-alaska-following-summit-with-trump/. 
 41.  Jeanette Lee Falsey, Gov. Walker Breaks Down His Alaska Meeting with 
Chinese President Xi Jinping, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 9, 2017), 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2017/04/08/gov-walker-breaks-down-
his-meeting-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping/. 
 42.  Id. 
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traveled to Fairbanks to view the aurora borealis.43 On May 25, 2018, 
Alaska tourism promoter Explore Fairbanks announced that it had signed 
a deal with Chinese tourism company East West Marketing Corporation 
to promote Alaskan tourism in China, including establishing an Alaskan 
presence on Chinese social media.44 
President Xi’s visit to Anchorage led to Governor Walker’s 2017 
trade mission to China.45 The trade mission included Governor Walker 
and other state officials, as well as representatives of the seafood industry, 
tourism industry, local economic development organizations, a baby food 
company, and a craft brewery, among other entities.46 The delegation’s 
meetings took place in Chengdu, Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, 
where delegates met with businesses including Chinese e-commerce 
giants JD.com and Alibaba Group.47 The delegates also sought to establish 
direct flights between Alaska and China and even met with China’s 
Sports Minister to discuss having Chinese Olympic athletes train in 
Alaska.48 The Chinese downhill and cross-country ski teams and ice 
hockey team will all participate in year-long training in Alaska to prepare 
for the 2022 Winter Olympics.49 
Another major topic discussed during Governor Walker’s trade 
mission to China was the Alaska Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project.50 
On November 9, 2017, Governor Walker signed a joint development 
agreement with Chinese energy company Sinopec, China’s sovereign 
wealth fund China Investment Corporation, and the Bank of China, all 
owned by the Chinese government.51 The joint development agreement is 
a nonbinding agreement to work towards developing a new pipeline in 
Alaska to carry natural gas from Prudhoe Bay to a liquefaction plant in 
 
 43.  Wang Guan, Alaska Eyes Stronger Engagement with China on Tourism, Gas, 
CGTN (Sept. 18, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://news.cgtn.com/news/78677a4d35557a 
6333566d54/share_p.html. 
 44.  Elwood Brehmer, Explore Fairbanks Signs Deal on Gov’s China Trade Trip, 
ALASKA J. OF COM. (May 30, 2018, 10:24 AM), http://www.alaskajournal.com 
/2018-05-30/explore-fairbanks-signs-deal-govs-china-trade-trip#.W8jkFXtKiUk. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Alaska Businesses Selected for Opportunity Alaska: China Trade Mission, BILL 
WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (Apr. 18, 2018), https://gov.alaska.gov/ 
newsroom/2018/04/alaska-businesses-selected-for-opportunity-alaska-china-
trade-mission/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20181020183936/https:// 
gov.alaska.gov/newsroom/2018/04/alaska-businesses-selected-for-
opportunity-alaska-china-trade-mission/]. 
 47.  BILL WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 1. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Falsey, supra note 41. 
 51.  Elwood Brehmer, AK LNG Leaders Navigate Trade Battle with China, 
ALASKA J. OF COM. (July 18, 2018, 10:29 AM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/ 
2018-07-18/ak-lng-leaders-navigate-trade-battle-china#.W8jsYXtKiUk. 
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southern Alaska, from which the LNG could be shipped overseas.52 
Under the joint development agreement, Sinopec would receive 75% of 
the LNG from the new pipeline in exchange for the Chinese Investment 
Corporation and the Bank of China financing the $43 billion pipeline and 
liquefaction plant project.53 While trade relations with China and the U.S. 
federal government have deteriorated since the original joint 
development agreement was signed in 2017, the Alaska Gasline 
Development Corporation and three Chinese entities signed a 
supplemental agreement on October 2, 2018, reaffirming their 
“willingness to advance” the Alaska LNG Project.54 
B. The Threat from China to U.S. National Security 
As China and Alaska forge ahead in strengthening their economic 
bond, the relationship between China and the U.S. federal government 
continues to deteriorate.55 As discussed in the Introduction, Recorded 
Future reported that Chinese government-linked hackers probed Alaska 
state-owned computer servers for vulnerabilities following Governor 
Walker’s trade mission to China in 2017.56 In 2015, then-U.S. president 
Barack Obama and China’s President Xi reached a verbal agreement that, 
among other things, China would stop hacking U.S. companies to 
conduct economic espionage.57 Although the “Obama-Xi Agreement” did 
not stop all Chinese hacking, “we witnessed about [a] 90% drop in 
Chinese nation-state sponsored intrusions against [the] Western 
 
 52.  Sean Maguire, BP Alaska Signs onto the Alaska LNG Project in a “Historic 
Milestone”, KTUU (Sept. 10, 2018, 12:18 PM), https://www.ktuu.com/content 
/news/Gas-line-corporation-BP-make-progress-on-Alaska-gas-deal-
481981671.html. 
 53.  Ashley Feng & Sagatom Saha, China’s Arctic Ambitions in Alaska, 
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 20, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/chinas-arctic-
ambitions-in-alaska/. 
 54.  China and Alaska Reaffirm Willingness to Advance Alaska LNG, ALASKA 
GASLINE DEV. CORP. (Oct. 2, 2018), http://agdc.us/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/10/Press-Release-China-and-Alaska-Reaffirm-Willingness-to-Advance-
Alaska-LNG.pdf. The Alaska Gasline Development Corporation has since 
reaffirmed its intent to carry out the joint development agreement in the wake of 
the latest friction between Washington and Beijing. Elwood Brehmer, Tariff Pause 
Doesn’t Alter Talks with China on Alaska LNG, Officials Say, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS 
(Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2018/12/05/tariff-
pause-doesnt-alter-talks-with-china-on-alaska-lng-officials-say/. 
 55.  Julian Borger & Lily Kuo, US-China Tensions Soar as ‘New Cold War’ Heats 
Up, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2018/oct/16/us-china-new-cold-war-tensions. 
 56.  Bing & Stubbs, supra note 6. 
 57.  Robert Farley, Did the Obama-Xi Cyber Agreement Work?, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 
11, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/did-the-obama-xi-cyber-agreement 
-work/. 
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commercial sector,” a few months after they reached the agreement.58 On 
October 10, 2018, however, Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of preeminent 
cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike,59 announced on Twitter that “China is 
back (after a big dropoff in activity in 2016) to being the predominant 
nation-state intrusion threat in terms of volume of activity against 
Western industry.”60 
Alperovitch’s statement followed the FBI’s arrest of Yanjun Xu, a 
Chinese intelligence officer working for China’s Ministry of State 
Security.61 Yanjun Xu was extradited from Belgium to the United States 
on charges of economic espionage and theft of trade secrets from GE 
Aviation and other American aerospace companies.62 While China’s 
Ministry of State Security currently leads China’s international hacking 
efforts,63 the Department of Justice alleges that Xu targeted experts who 
worked at aerospace companies around the world and recruited these 
experts to travel to China to conduct economic espionage and steal trade 
secrets.64 This case joins countless other cases of Chinese operatives 
conducting economic espionage of U.S. companies.65 As Assistant 
Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s National Security 
Division John Demers noted in announcing Xu’s arrest, “[t]his case is not 
an isolated incident. It is part of an overall economic policy of developing 
China at American expense,” often through illegal means.66 
Trade and investment relations between China and the U.S. federal 
government have become a battleground over the balance of trade, trade 
in specific goods, and investment in specific businesses. As part of 
President Trump’s “trade war,” the federal government has imposed 25% 
tariffs on $250 billion worth of imports from China, which amount to 
about half of the United States’ overall imports from China.67 The Trump 
 
 58.  Borger & Kuo, supra note 55. 
 59.  CrowdStrike, like Recorded Future, is a private firm providing cyber 
threat intelligence to its clients, as well as conducting its own research into cyber 
threat actors, such as China. CROWDSTRIKE, https://www.crowdstrike.com/ (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2018). 
 60.  Dmitri Alperovitch (@DAlperovitch), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2018, 11:54 AM), 
https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1050097354869788673. 
 61.  Chinese Intelligence Officer Charged with Economic Espionage Involving Theft 
of Trade Secrets from Leading U.S. Aviation Companies, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 10, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-intelligence-officer-charged-
economic-espionage-involving-theft-trade-secrets-leading. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Alperovitch, supra note 60. 
 64.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 61. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Trump Slaps Tariffs on US$200b of Chinese Goods in Sharp Escalation of Trade 
War, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/ 
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administration has further threatened to impose tariffs on another $267 
billion worth of Chinese imports.68 China, by contrast, has imposed 25% 
tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. goods, out of the $130 billion worth of 
goods China imports from the United States.69 China has also filed a 
complaint with the World Trade Organization protesting the U.S. tariffs.70 
Alaska itself has been caught up in the trade war, with China imposing a 
25% tariff on Pacific Northwest seafood.71 This could have “devastating” 
impacts on Alaska’s largest export to its largest trading partner.72 
With specific exports to and investments from China, the federal 
government has been especially concerned with high technology 
developed in the United States. On the export side, the federal 
government recently imposed export controls on forty-four Chinese 
companies, allowing the federal government to control whether certain 
technology is exported to those companies.73 U.S. Trade Representative 
Robert Lighthizer explained that “China’s government is aggressively 
working to undermine America’s hi-tech industries and our economic 
leadership through unfair trade practices and industrial policies like 
Made in China 2025.”74 
On the investment side, U.S. policymakers have been concerned that 
“China is weaponizing its investment in the U.S. to exploit national 
security vulnerabilities, including the back-door transfer of dual-use U.S. 
technology and related know-how, aiding China’s military 
modernization and weakening the U.S. defense industrial base.”75 As of 
2017, China has invested in 7–10% of American startup companies 
 
world/united-states/trump-announces-10-tariffs-on-us200b-in-chinese-goods-
from-sept-24. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Donald Trump’s Many Trade Wars: A Summary, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2018, 8:33 AM), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/donald-
trumps-many-trade-wars-a-summary. 
 71.  Yereth Rosen, Alaska Seafood Industry Braces for China Tariff Pain, REUTERS 
(Aug. 12, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-
alaska/alaska-seafood-industry-braces-for-china-tariff-pain-idUSKBN1KX0CQ. 
 72.  Id. (“‘This isn’t an easily replaced market,’ [Frances Leach, executive 
director of Alaska’s largest commercial fishing trade group] said, ‘[w]hat’s going 
to happen is China is just going to stop buying Alaska fish.’”). 
 73.  Sarah Zheng, U.S. Slaps Export Controls on Dozens of Chinese Firms Over 
‘Threat to National Security’ as Trade Tensions Escalate, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(Aug. 2, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/2157932/us-slaps-export-controls-dozens-chinese-firms-over. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Jonathan Wakely & Andrew Indorf, Managing National Security Risk in an 
Open Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. 
L.J. 1, 26 (2018), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ 
WakelyIndorf_CFIUS_05.28.18.pdf. 
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through venture capital financing and is specifically investing in startups 
expected to be “foundational to future innovation in the U.S.: artificial 
intelligence, autonomous vehicles, augmented/virtual reality, robotics 
and blockchain technology.”76 These concerns drove Congress in August 
2018 to pass the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, 
which will strengthen the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS).77 
Alaska’s economic relationship with China is thus set against this 
increasingly contentious relationship between the U.S. federal 
government and China. While the federal government has not yet 
intervened to block or regulate any of Alaska’s direct relations with the 
Chinese government, the U.S. has begun to do so in Israel, where the 
federal government has pressured the Israeli government to curtail its 
economic relationship with China based on national security concerns.78 
Like the China-Alaska relationship, Israel’s mutually beneficial 
relationship with China has grown in recent years.79 Further, like Alaska, 
Israel has embraced increased Chinese investments in local industries and 
increased Israeli exports to China.80 While Israel is not a state like Alaska, 
this situation nonetheless evidences the U.S. federal government’s 
 
 76.  MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET SINGH, DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT 
EXPERIMENTAL, CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: HOW CHINESE 
INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGY ENABLE A STRATEGIC COMPETITOR TO 
ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. INNOVATION 2 (2018), https://admin.govexec 
.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf. 
 77.  Mercy A. Kuo, CFIUS and China: The FIRRMA Factor, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/cfius-and-china-the-firrma-factor/. 
CFIUS is an interagency group chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury which is 
empowered to block or mitigate corporate transactions that may lead to foreign 
control of American businesses implicating U.S. national security. Wakely & 
Indorf, supra note 75, at 7. President Trump recently blocked an attempted 
Chinese takeover of a U.S. semiconductor manufacturer on the recommendation 
of CFIUS. Seth Fiegerman & Jackie Wattles, Trump Stops China-Backed Takeover of 
U.S. Chip Maker, CNN (Sept. 14, 2017, 12:47 AM), https://money.cnn.com/ 
2017/09/13/technology/business/trump-lattice-china/index.html. China itself 
has begun to respond to the U.S. federal government’s increasing vigilance 
against Chinese investment by blocking U.S. chipmaker Qualcomm’s purchase of 
Dutch chipmaker NXP. Don Clark, Qualcomm Scraps $44 Billion NXP After China 
Inaction, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/ 
technology/qualcomm-nxp-china-deadline.html. 
 78.  David Rosenberg, Israel Will Have to Choose Between America and China, 
HAARETZ (Jan. 8, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/. 
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 79.  Omree Wechsler, Caught Between Giants: How Will Israel Navigate the U.S.-
China Tech Cold War?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/caught-between-giants-how-will-israel-navigate-us-
china-tech-cold-war. 
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willingness to intervene in the economic relations between two other 
sovereigns to protect national security. 
The Alaska LNG Project, moreover, has become a bargaining chip in 
ongoing U.S.-China trade discussions.81 The project has been seen as an 
“olive branch” in trade talks between the U.S. federal government and 
China,82 but it could be destroyed if trade relations continue to deteriorate 
or concerns about Chinese involvement in energy projects increase. 
Energy, as critical infrastructure, is both a part of China’s “Made in China 
2025” initiative83 and subject to CFIUS oversight as part of its mandate to 
protect U.S. national security.84 Congress’s passage of the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 was a direct response 
to the perceived threat of Chinese investment and was intended to give 
CFIUS greater power to scrutinize such transactions.85   
As the LNG project progresses and Alaska’s economic ties with 
China grow stronger, the U.S. federal government may begin to pressure 
Alaska in the same way that it has pressured Israel to reduce ties with 
China. Alaska’s interests in the LNG project are thus on a potential 
collision course with the U.S. federal government’s interest in protecting 
U.S. national security. This situation makes the anti-commandeering 
doctrine especially relevant because it prevents the federal government 
from forcing Alaska to act, requiring instead that the federal government 
itself regulate or block the LNG project, for example, to accomplish its 
national security goals. 
III. A LONG HISTORY OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN 
COMMERCE 
The current tension between Alaska, China, and the United States 
hardly represents the first time that a state’s interest in foreign commerce 
has run counter to the interests of the federal government. The conflict 
between the commercial interests of the individual states and the nation 
as a whole under the Articles of Confederation in large part led to the 
adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1788, drafted to empower the federal 
government to exert greater control over foreign affairs and foreign 
 
 81.  Yereth Rosen, Alaska Officials Still Bullish on China Nat Gas Partnership, 
REUTERS (July 11, 2018, 10:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
lng-alaska/alaska-officials-still-bullish-on-china-nat-gas-partnership-
idUSKBN1K2060. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Scott Kennedy, Made in China 2025, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES 
(June 1, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025. 
 84.  50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2018). 
 85.  Kuo, supra note 77. 
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commerce.86 Despite this constitutional intent, the states have continued 
to participate in foreign commerce even when the states’ interests conflict 
with those of the federal government. To provide context, this Section will 
address several key episodes in U.S. history that demonstrate the states’ 
ongoing roles in foreign commerce. It will also describe the relatively 
recent reemergence of the states’ roles in foreign commerce as a response 
to globalization.87 This balance of power protects Alaska’s full-throated 
advocacy of its economic stake in the LNG project and would require the 
federal government to expend costly political capital to scuttle the project 
directly. 
A. The Embargo Act of 1807 
The events surrounding the implementation of the Embargo Act of 
1807 and its effects in the United States elucidate the relationship between 
the states and the federal government with regard to foreign commerce 
in the early Republic. In 1803, the Peace of Amiens dissolved and Britain 
and France resumed their war against each other.88 Beginning in 1803, as 
part of the war effort, Britain began the practice of impressment of 
American sailors, which involved stopping U.S. ships in international 
waters and forcing American sailors to join the Royal Navy.89 The 
Chesapeake-Leopard affair, in which the HMS Leopard attacked and boarded 
the unsuspecting USS Chesapeake, nearly brought Britain and the United 
States to war in 1807.90 
Later that year, Britain instituted a wartime policy requiring all U.S. 
ships to pass through Britain and obtain a license to trade with Europe, 
effectively blockading Europe.91 France responded by ordering that any 
ship securing a British license to trade would be seized.92 Thus, U.S. ships 
could no longer trade across the Atlantic without being seized by either 
Britain or France.93 U.S. President Thomas Jefferson and Congress 
responded by enacting the Embargo Act of 1807, which prohibited all U.S. 
ships from leaving port to trade with foreign countries.94 The Act’s goal 
 
 86.  YOUNG, supra note 22, at 1–2. 
 87.  This Note considers “globalization” to be the growing interconnectedness 
and interdependence of world economies and economic activities, including 
trade, investment, and tourism, across national borders. 
 88.  GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN 
RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 114 (2008). 
 89.  Id. at 117. 
 90.  Id. at 118. 
 91.  Id. at 119. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  LOUIS MARTIN SEARS, JEFFERSON AND THE EMBARGO 59–60 (1927). 
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was to protect American ships and coerce Britain and France to rescind 
their wartime policies through a single, coherent American stance.95 
At the time of the embargo, the United States had been exporting one 
million tons of goods overseas.96 Of this total, Massachusetts controlled 
about one-third, equaling an estimated $38.2 million in 1807.97 In New 
England, “[n]ot only would shipowners and their dependent seaman face 
severe loss and privation, but [sic] farmers would be deprived of their 
customary market for lumber and potash, butter, grain, etc. . . . .”98 New 
England vigorously opposed the embargo to protect its economic 
relationship with Europe, especially Britain.99 As President Jefferson 
lamented, 
the ascendancy which Great Britain exercises over us through. . . 
her omnipotence over our Commercial men, is most deplorable. 
In the existing difficulties she has proved that these 
circumstances aided by her intrigues and money have enabled 
her to shake our Union to its center, to control its legislative and 
Executive authorities, to force them from the measures which 
their judgment would have approved . . . .100 
Of importance to the anti-commandeering doctrine, President 
Jefferson at first did not require the states to enforce the embargo.101 
Instead, Jefferson sent letters to the governors of Georgia, the Territory of 
Orleans, South Carolina, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, merely 
requesting that they help enforce the embargo.102 As economic conditions 
worsened in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, the state 
governments began publicly rejecting the federal government’s power to 
require their enforcement of the embargo.103 Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 145. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 298. (“American commerce had long been the mainstay of British 
foreign exchange. Under normal conditions, the direct American trade supplied 
Great Britain with cotton, lumber, flax, and tobacco. But America was still more 
important as a market, and the balance of trade was high in favor of Great 
Britain.”). 
 100.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander McRae (Feb. 8, 1809), 
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-
04-01-02-9746. 
 101.  Dennis James Palumbo, The States and American Foreign Relations 40–
41 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with 
author). 
 102.  Id. at 41. 
 103.  Id. at 43–46. 
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all passed resolutions refusing to enforce the embargo on the basis of state 
sovereignty.104 
The Connecticut General Assembly’s proclamation regarding the 
Embargo Act drew important distinctions with regard to the Act’s 
enforceability: 
The members of the General Assembly . . . have . . . decided, that 
in such a crisis of affairs, it is right, and has become the duty of 
the legislative and executive authorities in the State, to withhold 
their aid, and co-operation from the execution of the act, passed 
to enforce more effectually the embargo system. . . . While it is 
the duty of the Legislature to guard the sovereignty of the State, 
and your rights from encroachment, it continues to be your duty, 
as peaceable citizens, to abstain from all resistance, against acts, 
which purport to be laws of the United States. Be advised to seek 
none but constitutional relief.105 
Connecticut did not declare the embargo itself unconstitutional, nor 
did Connecticut tell its citizens that they could disregard the embargo. 
Instead, the Connecticut General Assembly explained that the state 
government itself could not be compelled to enforce the federal law, even 
though the Embargo Act regulated Connecticut’s citizens individually. 
The Connecticut state government refused to allow the federal 
government to commandeer it. In 1809, under mounting pressure from 
the states, Congress voted to repeal the Embargo Act.106 
This episode from the early Republic demonstrates two key points. 
First, the states played significant roles in foreign commerce at the 
country’s founding, when the Framers of the U.S. Constitution staked out 
the sovereign powers of the states and the federal government. Second, 
while the federal government could regulate the flow of goods in foreign 
commerce through the embargo, the states retained—at least in their 
view107 and in their practice108—a measure of sovereignty. While the 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  SEARS, supra note 94, at 185–86. 
 106.  Id. at 46–47. The Embargo Act was replaced with a non-intercourse act 
which only barred trade with Britain and France, allowing American ships to 
leave U.S. ports for other foreign countries. Id. at 47. The non-intercourse act, 
however, was easily circumvented by U.S. ships and thus did not raise the same 
protests between New England and the Mid-Atlantic states. Id. 
 107.  SEARS, supra note 94, at 185–86. Recall the Connecticut General Assembly’s 
proclamation discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
 108.  Palumbo, supra note 101, at 43–46. Recall that Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York all 
refused to enforce the Embargo Act as an unconstitutional violation of state 
sovereignty. 
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federal government could enact its own foreign economic policy, it could 
not make the states its agents in implementing that policy. 
B. From the Early Republic to the Modern Era109 
The Embargo Act failed to influence the wartime economic policies 
of Britain and France110 and irreparably harmed U.S. shipping interests by 
preventing trade with Latin America, allowing Britain to monopolize the 
market.111 The Embargo Act, however, spurred the growth of 
manufacturing in the United States.112 Further, westward expansion in 
North America opened new domestic markets to U.S. commercial 
interests, reducing the need to export and import goods from overseas.113 
Following the U.S. Civil War, the U.S. federal government became the 
“predominant force” in U.S. foreign policy.114 World Wars I and II and the 
Cold War further solidified this position.115 
C. The Reemergence of the States in Foreign Commerce 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the states became more involved in foreign 
commerce.116 This reemergence began with North Carolina Governor 
Luther Hodges’s trade mission to Europe in 1959.117 Governor Hodges led 
a delegation to Western Europe seeking foreign direct investment in 
North Carolina and “explored potential economic opportunities in the 
Soviet Union.”118 In 1969, Virginia placed a trade officer in Brussels in an 
attempt to attract European business to the state.119 Jimmy Carter, as 
governor of Georgia from 1971 to 1975, estimated that he spent nearly one 
quarter of his time in office promoting Georgia’s exports and soliciting 
investment in the state from overseas.120 By 1986, the states had opened 
sixty-six trade offices overseas.121 By 1994, that number had grown to 162 
 
 109.  This Section necessarily glosses over roughly 150 years of U.S. history. As 
this Note is not a treatise on U.S. commercial history, this Section will simply 
describe several key points about the time period between the early Republic and 
the reemergence of the states in foreign commerce in the 1950s. 
 110.  HERRING, supra note 88, at 119–21. 
 111.  SEARS, supra note 94, at 192. 
 112.  Id. at 197. 
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 116.  See id. at 67–69 (discussing the increase in the number of states seeking 
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offices.122 In 1993, governors from twenty-seven U.S. states and territories 
sent eighty-one trade and investment missions abroad.123 
Currently, forty states operate a total of 199 trade offices abroad.124 
China is the most popular country in which states open trade offices, 
where states currently operate twenty-seven such offices.125 Moreover, 
nearly every state has a home office devoted to promoting trade abroad.126 
These trade offices facilitate trade missions and trade shows and counsel 
local businesses on exporting goods.127 Most of these trade offices are also 
responsible for soliciting foreign direct investment in their states.128 
Further, states have entered into over 340 agreements with foreign 
countries and political sub-units.129 The states have entered into sixty-one 
agreements with China or Chinese political sub-units, the second most 
after Canada.130 Overall, the states have entered into at least 128 
agreements that concern trade and technology.131 Alaska’s joint 
development agreement with China to develop the liquid natural gas 
project represents just one of these agreements. Alaska also entered into 
a memorandum of understanding with Taiwan, in which Alaska agreed 
to expand development of its coal production in return for Taiwanese 
state-owned energy companies purchasing the coal produced.132 
While most of the states’ promotion of economic engagement abroad 
comports with the U.S. federal government’s interests, a few notable 
instances show where these interests may conflict. In the late 1970s, the 
regime of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya sought the help of U.S. 
politicians from Idaho to re-open a deal to sell C-130 troop-transport 
planes to the Libyan government that the State Department had 
blocked.133 The Qaddafi regime hosted Idaho farmers, businessmen, and 
even a U.S. senator in Libya, and Colonel Qaddafi himself met with 
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 123.  Id. 
 124.  Jennifer Burnett, Beyond Borders: State International Trade Offices, THE 
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 130.  Id. at 753 fig.3. 
 131.  Id. at 755 fig.4. 
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Ministry of Econ. Affairs of China, Alaska-U.S.-China., Sept. 16, 2004, 
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 133.  William Safire, Libya and Idaho, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 1979), 
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Idaho’s congressman Representative Steven Symms.134 The trade talks 
between Idaho and Libya reportedly led to $30 million in wheat deals, but 
Libya never received the planes.135 
In 2003, Kansas governor Kathleen Sebelius reached an agreement 
with Cuba’s food trade agency that Cuba would purchase $10 million 
worth of Kansas agricultural products in exchange for Kansas advocating 
for the removal of federal trade and travel sanctions against Cuba.136 In 
2005, Kansas’s lieutenant governor announced the sale of $3 million 
worth of wheat to Cuba and his support for a bill introduced by a Kansas 
congressman in the U.S. House of Representatives to repeal sanctions 
against Cuba.137 The bill, however, went nowhere.138 Nevertheless, 
interest groups in Kansas and members of Kansas’s congressional 
delegation continue to advocate for trade with Cuba.139 
IV. FEDERAL POWER OVER FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTI-
COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE 
Due to the states’ increasing role in foreign commerce, state and 
federal policies regarding China are on a potential collision course.  Thus, 
it is important to understand what constitutional and statutory power the 
federal government has to control foreign commerce. This Section will 
first discuss these powers over foreign commerce. This Section will then 
describe the anti-commandeering doctrine and how it may protect certain 
state activities in foreign commerce from federal control. 
A. Federal Power to Control Foreign Commerce 
The Supreme Court’s doctrinal view, which has been criticized as 
legally unsound and ignorant of the states’ and the federal government’s 
historical practice,140 has long been that the federal government exercises 
 
 134.  Id. 
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 137.  Id. at 741 n.4. 
 138.  Id. at 741 n.3. 
 139.  Engage Cuba & Kansas Farmers Launch State Council to Lift the Cuban 
Embargo, ENGAGE CUBA COALITION (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.engagecuba.org 
/press-releases/2016/9/19/engage-cuba-kansas-farmers-launch-state-council-
to-lift-the-cuban-embargo?rq=kansas (citing support from Kansas’s two U.S. 
senators and a past chairman of the Kansas Wheat Commission). 
 140.  See Cleveland, supra note 20, at 975 (“The ‘one-voice’ doctrine is a myth. 
It finds little support in the constitutional framework, which divides foreign 
relations powers among the three federal branches, and even less in the practice 
of government.”); David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 954 
(2014) (“[W]hile the doctrine partially captures constitutional principles, it is in 
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total control over foreign affairs and may prohibit state participation 
therein.141 In 1840, the Court explained, “It was the main object of the 
Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one 
people, one nation.”142 In 1937, the Court reiterated, “[I]n respect of our 
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes, the 
state . . . does not exist.”143 In 1942, the Court stated, “Power over external 
affairs is not shared with the States; it is vested in the national government 
exclusively.”144 
This principle of exclusive federal control over foreign affairs is 
known as the “one-voice” doctrine.145 The one-voice doctrine does not 
accurately describe the state of affairs in U.S. foreign relations, either 
historically or currently. Moreover, scholars have frequently asserted that 
the one-voice doctrine conflicts with the text of the Constitution and the 
constitutional principles of the separation of powers and federalism.146 
The text of the Constitution and Congress’s actual enactments provide a 
more accurate picture of federal power over foreign commerce. 
Textually, Congress is empowered to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations147 and to give advice and consent on treaties,148 among 
other powers relating to foreign affairs. The Constitution grants the 
President the powers to make treaties,149 appoint ambassadors,150 receive 
ambassadors,151 and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.152 The 
Constitution also explicitly prohibits the states from entering into “any 
treaty, alliance, or confederation”153 and requires Congress’s consent 
before a state may “enter into any agreement or compact . . . with a 
foreign power.”154 Nevertheless, the Constitution does not grant the 
 
key respects inconsistent with constitutional text, structure, and history.”). 
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 146.  See Cleveland, supra note 20, at 975; Moore, supra note 140 at 991–99. 
 147.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 148.  Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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 153.  Id. art. I, § 10. 
 154.  Id. The Court has interpreted the Compacts Clause to require 
congressional approval of compacts or agreements where the compact or 
agreement encroaches on federal supremacy. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 
363, 369 (1976). Yet, the Supreme Court has only ever reviewed one alleged 
compact between a state and a foreign country, despite the existence of over 340 
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federal government a blanket “foreign affairs power” and does not 
prohibit the states from promoting their economic relations with foreign 
countries. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights reserves 
to the states all powers not specifically granted to the federal 
government.155 
Congress has enacted several statutory schemes under its 
constitutional powers to control foreign commerce for national security 
reasons. First, under the Exon-Florio Act and subsequent legislation, 
CFIUS has jurisdiction to review foreign direct investment in the United 
States that results in foreign control of a U.S. business.156 CFIUS may 
“enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any 
party to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the 
national security of the United States that arises as a result of the . . . 
transaction.”157 Second, under the Export Administration Regulations 
(EAR), the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
has authority to control the export of “any goods or technology” the 
export of which would “prove detrimental” to U.S. national security.158 
Finally, under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the 
State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has the 
authority to control the export or import of weapons.159 
Outside of Congress’s powers to control foreign commerce, the 
Supreme Court has developed its own doctrines regarding state 
participation in foreign commerce. Chief among these doctrines is the 
 
agreements between states and foreign countries. Hollis, supra note 17, at 779. 
 155.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 156.  Wakely & Indorf, supra note 75, at 7–9. 
 157.  Id. at 9 (internal quotations omitted). 
 158.  Id. at 11. The EAR include a list of goods that may only be exported subject 
to licensing by the Department of Commerce. Id. at 11–12. These goods are 
typically “dual-use” goods, meaning that they “have both commercial and 
military” applications. Id. at 12 (internal quotations omitted). Such goods include 
nuclear materials, electronics, and avionics, among others. Id. The EAR also 
include a list of countries to whom exporting requires a special license. Id. 
Congress recently passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, which 
authorizes the Department of Commerce to identify “emerging” and 
“foundational” technologies to add to the EAR list. Commerce Requests Comment 
on Criteria for Identifying Emerging Technologies That Are Essential to U.S. National 
Security, COVINGTON & BURLING (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.cov.com/-
/media/files/corporate/publications/2018/11/commerce_requests_comment_
on_criteria_for_identifying_emerging_technologies_that_are_essential_to_us_na
tional_security.pdf. The Department of Commerce is considering adding 
technology categories including biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and 
robotics. Id. 
 159.  Wakely & Indorf, supra note 75, at 12–13. Under the ITAR, the State 
Department maintains a list of weapons that require a license to export. Id. This 
list also includes defense services and technical data related to listed weapons. Id. 
at 13. 
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dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Early in the 19th century, the Court 
ruled that the states may not impose burdensome regulations on foreign 
commerce even where Congress has not passed relevant legislation.160 
Here, however, Alaska is not regulating foreign commerce, but instead 
seeking to promote it. More relevant, then, is the Supremacy Clause, 
under which a federal statute, treaty, or congressional-executive 
agreement may displace conflicting state law that affects foreign 
commerce.161 For example, if Alaska passed its own export regulations, 
those regulations would be unconstitutional to the extent that they 
conflicted with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Export 
Administration Regulations. This Note, however, argues that the anti-
commandeering doctrine protects Alaska’s promotion of its economic 
relationship with China, as opposed to its regulation thereof. The 
principal distinction between regulation and promotion is that, in 
promoting foreign commerce, Alaska acts as a political representative of 
its citizens, whereas, in regulating foreign commerce, Alaska would enact 
and enforce the law. 
B. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
The anti-commandeering doctrine delineates the outer bounds of 
Congress’s constitutional powers.162 Thus, while Congress has broad 
powers to regulate foreign commerce,163 the anti-commandeering 
doctrine recognizes that those powers have limits.164 Congress does not 
have the power “to issue direct orders to the governments of the 
States.”165 The anti-commandeering doctrine enforces the respective 
sovereignties of the federal government and the states, with the federal 
government possessing the powers enumerated in the Constitution and 
all residual powers reserved to the states.166 The anti-commandeering 
doctrine, moreover, reflects the constitutional structure in which the 
federal government and the state governments regulate individuals, but 
in which the federal government does not regulate the state governments 
themselves as it had under the Articles of Confederation.167 
The Supreme Court first developed the anti-commandeering 
doctrine in New York v. United States.168 New York involved a federal 
 
 160.  Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
 161.  See generally Amer. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 162.  Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475–76 (2018). 
 163.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 164.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 1475. 
 167.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
 168.  Id. 
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statute that required states to provide for the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste generated within their borders or to take title to that 
waste and become liable for any damages resulting from the failure to 
dispose of it.169 The Court ruled that this provision commandeered the 
state legislatures in violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine.170 The 
Court reasoned that 
[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon 
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States . . . . We 
have always understood that even where Congress has the 
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or 
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the 
States to require or prohibit those acts.171 
In other words, Congress may directly regulate individuals, but Congress 
may not force the states to regulate individuals. 
In Printz v. United States,172 the Court expanded the anti-
commandeering doctrine to apply not only to state legislatures, but also 
to state executive officials.173 Printz concerned a federal law that required 
local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun 
purchasers.174 The Court ruled that, under the anti-commandeering 
doctrine, “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”175 The Court cited the absence in 
the historical record of federal statutes imposing obligations on state 
officials as support for the anti-commandeering doctrine.176 Thus, where 
Congress could not force state legislatures to enact policies, neither could 
it force state executive officials to enforce federal policies. 
Most recently, in Murphy v. NCAA,177 the Court expanded the anti-
commandeering doctrine to apply to negative prohibitions on state 
actions.178 In Murphy, the Court addressed a federal statute that 
prohibited state legislatures from authorizing sports gambling.179 The 
Court reasoned that “[i]t was a matter of happenstance that the laws 
 
 169.  Id. at 174–75. 
 170.  Id. at 175. 
 171.  Id. at 166. 
 172.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 173.  Id. at 928. 
 174.  Id. at 902–04. 
 175.  Id. at 935. 
 176.  Id. at 907–08. 
 177.  138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 178.  Id. at 1478. 
 179.  Id. at 1468. 
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challenged in New York and Printz commanded ‘affirmative’ action as 
opposed to imposing a prohibition. The basic principle—that Congress 
cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.”180 
Congress may neither force a state legislature to enact a certain policy, nor 
may Congress prohibit a state legislature from enacting a certain policy. 
Under the Court’s jurisprudence, the anti-commandeering doctrine 
reflects three principles of the Constitution’s structure of dual-
sovereignty. First, divided sovereignty between the federal and state 
governments promotes the liberty of individuals.181 Second, the anti-
commandeering doctrine promotes political accountability, so that 
“[v]oters who like or dislike the effects of regulation know who to credit 
and who to blame” for that regulation.182 And third, the anti-
commandeering doctrine “prevents Congress from shifting the costs of 
regulation to the States” from the federal government.183 The Court uses 
these principles to help determine where the anti-commandeering 
doctrine applies.184 Therefore, where a statute conflicts with these 
principles, the anti-commandeering doctrine is more likely to apply. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine has important limits. Reno v. 
Condon185 involved a statute prohibiting states from disclosing certain 
information collected through driver’s license applications.186 South 
Carolina challenged the statute as violating the anti-commandeering 
doctrine because it directed the states not to take a certain action.187 The 
Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that, where a federal statute “does not 
require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own 
citizens,” Congress does not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.188 
The Court thus concluded that the anti-commandeering doctrine did not 
prevent Congress from prohibiting states from disclosing information 
collected through driver’s license applications.189 Condon may thus 
 
 180.  Id. at 1478. 
 181.  Id. at 1477 (“A healthy balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government reduces the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”) 
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992)). 
 182.  Id. at 1477 (“By contrast, if a State imposes regulations only because it has 
been commanded to do so by Congress, responsibility is blurred.”). 
 183.  Id. (“If Congress enacts a law and requires enforcement by the Executive 
Branch, it must appropriate the funds needed to administer the program. It is 
pressured to weight the expected benefits of the program against its costs. But if 
Congress can compel the States to enact and enforce its program, Congress need 
not engage in any such analysis.”). 
 184.  See id. 
 185.  528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 147. 
 188.  Id. at 151. 
 189.  Id. 
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suggest that the anti-commandeering doctrine does not apply where the 
state is not regulating its citizens. 
The Court, moreover, has ruled that Congress may regulate state 
bond issuance, reasoning that such regulation does not “seek to control 
or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.”190 The 
Court in Murphy affirmed that “even if [the bond regulation] was 
tantamount to an outright prohibition of the issuance of bearer bonds . . . 
the law would simply treat state bonds the same as private bonds. The 
anti-commandeering doctrine does not apply when Congress 
evenhandedly regulates an activity in which the States and private actors 
engage.”191 Thus, the anti-commandeering doctrine does not prohibit 
federal statutes that regulate state governments in the same way that 
Congress normally regulates private individuals. 
The question is thus whether the anti-commandeering doctrine 
protects a state’s promotion of its economic relationship with a foreign 
country as within the state’s residual sovereignty or whether the 
regulation of a state’s economic relationship would simply be Congress’s 
permissible regulation of a state as a private party. 
C. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Would Likely Protect Alaska’s 
Promotion of its Economic Relationship with China 
Whether the anti-commandeering doctrine applies in a particular 
instance involves two complementary inquiries.192 First, whether the 
Constitution has authorized Congress to act.193 And, second, whether 
Congress’s action “invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by 
the Tenth Amendment.”194 Regarding the first inquiry, the Supreme 
Court has held that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to issue 
direct orders to state governments.195 Here, a federal statute prohibiting 
the government of Alaska from promoting its economic relationship with 
China through trade missions and other intergovernmental relations with 
 
 190.  South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988). 
 191.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
 192.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1997). The Court in New York 
explained that these two inquiries were “mirror images of each other,” meaning 
that, if Congress did not have the constitutional authority to act, Congress would 
necessarily invade a state’s sovereignty. Id. at 156. This analysis was refined in 
Condon, however, in which the Court explained that Congress may regulate state 
governments directly so long as Congress regulates states as private actors rather 
than in the states’ sovereign capacity. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
 193.  New York, 505 U.S. at 155. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476. 
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the Chinese government would constitute a direct order to the 
government of Alaska.196 
Regarding the second inquiry, the Supreme Court has held that a 
state acts in its sovereign capacity for the purposes of the anti-
commandeering doctrine when the state regulates its citizens.197 The 
Court has not held, however, that a state only acts in its sovereign capacity 
when it regulates its citizens.198 Indeed, the Court has recognized that a 
state may act in its sovereign capacity when it protects “public or 
governmental interests that concern the state as a whole,” including 
“when the ‘substantial impairment of the health and prosperity of the 
towns and cities of the state’ are at stake.”199 This aspect of state 
sovereignty is referred to as “parens patriae.”200 Notably, the Court has 
recognized that a state may act as parens patriae to protect the commercial 
interests of its citizens.201 The Court described the state’s role as parens 
patriae as the “trustee, guardian, or representative of all her citizens.”202 
While the Court has not had the opportunity to rule on whether a 
state acting as parens patriae satisfies the second inquiry under the anti-
commandeering doctrine, this Note argues that it would satisfy the 
inquiry here. The Supreme Court’s historical and policy rationales 
underlying its application of the anti-commandeering doctrine in 
previous cases support the doctrine’s protection of Alaska’s role as parens 
patriae in the context of its economic relationship with China. The state of 
Alaska acts as parens patriae when it promotes its economic relationship 
with China on behalf of its citizens, protecting the wealth and prosperity 
of the state as a whole. To require the Alaska state government to enforce 
the federal government’s policy of non-intercourse with China would 
 
 196.  See id. at 1478 (holding that the anti-commandeering doctrine applies 
where Congress imposes a prohibition on a state’s action). 
 197.  See id. at 1479 (describing the states’ regulation of their own citizens as the 
states’ “sovereign authority”). 
 198.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 155 (explaining that the determination hinges on 
“state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment,” without limiting the 
sovereignty determination to whether a state is regulating its own citizens). 
 199.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007) (citing Missouri v. 
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 240–41 (1901)). 
 200.  Id. at 520 n.17. Parens patriae, literally meaning “parent of his or her 
country,” refers to the state in its sovereign capacity as protecting its citizens. 
Parens patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 201.  Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. 
P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982) (explaining that the Louisiana Court “labeled 
Louisiana’s interest in the litigation as that of parens patriae”). The Court ultimately 
dismissed the suit because Louisiana’s dispute was with the Texas health officer 
rather than Texas itself, thus falling outside of the Court’s original jurisdiction. Id. 
at 22–23. 
 202.  Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 19. 
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thus vitiate Alaska’s sovereign prerogative to represent its citizens in 
violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine. 
Historical practice also supports the anti-commandeering doctrine’s 
protection of Alaska’s economic relationship with China from federal 
interference. According to the Court in Printz, “early congressional 
enactments provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the 
Constitution’s meaning. Indeed, such contemporaneous legislative 
exposition of the Constitution, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes 
the construction to be given its provisions.”203 In the events surrounding 
the Embargo Act of 1807, President Jefferson did not initially demand that 
the states enforce the Embargo Act on behalf of the federal government, 
but instead requested that certain state governments do so.204 When the 
President did demand that the states enforce the Act, the states declared 
such demands unconstitutional.205 Thus, Congress could require that 
individual citizens obey the Embargo Act, but Congress could not require 
the state governments to enforce the Act on its behalf.206 Indeed, the anti-
commandeering doctrine polices the line between federal and state 
sovereignty, apportioning political accountability between the two 
sovereigns, rather than entirely prohibiting the federal government from 
achieving its ultimate policy goal. 
The balance of power between the federal government and the states 
resulting from the Embargo Act episode represents an early 
understanding of the federal government’s and the states’ dual 
sovereignty. At the dawn of the Republic, the federal government could 
not force the states to enforce federal economic policy and the states were 
free to politically advocate their own economic policies.207 Indeed, the 
federal government has acquiesced to this balance of power at least since 
the late 1950s as the states’ roles in foreign commerce have reemerged.208 
The federal government has not attempted to regulate the states’ 
economic relationships with foreign sovereigns, even where those 
relationships are directly at odds with federal foreign policy.209 This 
acquiescence, both in the early Republic and over the last 60 years, 
 
 203.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (internal brackets 
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 204.  See supra Section III.A. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  See supra Section III.C. 
 209.  See id. (describing relations between Idaho and the Qaddafi regime and 
between Kansas and Cuba); see also Hollis, supra note 17, at 2 (“Kansas’s agreement 
received no constitutional scrutiny whatsoever. Congress did not disavow the 
deal. The Executive did nothing to oppose it.”). 
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supports a constitutional construction that protects the states’ roles in 
foreign commerce. 
Alaska’s economic relationship with China also promotes the three 
principles of dual sovereignty that underlie the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.210 First, the anti-commandeering doctrine promotes Alaskans’ 
economic freedom by protecting the state government’s role in advancing 
economic ties with China.  Second, a federal statute prohibiting Alaska 
from promoting an economic relationship with China would blur political 
accountability for the success (or failure) of Alaska’s economy. Alaskan 
exports to China bring nearly $5 billion into the state,211 supporting over 
6000 jobs.212 The state government’s efforts to promote Alaskan exports—
by conducting trade missions and hosting Chinese government officials 
in the state—are presumably responsible for much of this success. When 
federal regulations harm Alaskan exports, as when the Trump 
administration’s tariffs on China trigger retaliatory measures,213 the 
citizens of Alaska know whom to blame—the federal government—and 
may take appropriate action by voting federal policymakers out of 
office.214 However, if the federal government prohibits the Alaskan 
government from conducting trade missions and promoting Alaskan 
exports, the political burden may shift to Alaskan policymakers, who 
would not be responsible for their own inaction. While one might argue 
that the citizens of Alaska will still know to blame the federal government 
and could still vote federal policymakers out of office, the Supreme Court 
has accepted this rationale as underpinning its anti-commandeering 
decisions.215 
Furthermore, a federal statute barring Alaska’s promotion of its 
economic relationship with China would improperly shift the cost of 
regulation from the federal government to Alaska. In much the same way 
that a prohibition on economic relations between Alaska and China 
would impose political costs, so too would such a prohibition impose 
monetary costs. Not only would the state, and therefore its citizens, lose 
tax dollars, but Alaska would also be responsible for the harm to its 
overall economy. For example, where the federal government, through 
the Trump administration’s trade war, has cost farmers in the Midwest 
 
 210.  See supra text accompanying notes 181–184. 
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 214.  See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (“When Congress itself 
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billions of dollars due to retaliatory tariffs, the federal government has 
been forced through political pressure to provide billions of dollars in 
farm subsidies.216 In this instance, the system of dual sovereignty has 
worked correctly, as the same sovereign that harmed its constituents 
reaped the political costs. A federal prohibition on Alaska’s economic 
relationship with its largest trading partner, however, could impose 
similar costs on Alaska through political pressure to provide subsidies, 
even though Alaska would not be responsible for the prohibition itself. 
The argument that the anti-commandeering doctrine protects 
Alaska’s economic relationship with China from federal interference does 
face challenges. The anti-commandeering doctrine has only been 
interpreted to protect state actions where the federal government has 
sought to direct the states to regulate in a certain way.217 While Alaska’s 
promotion of its economic relationship with China is not regulation, 
Alaska nonetheless acts within its sovereign capacity when it promotes 
the welfare of its citizens.218 The anti-commandeering doctrine thus 
protects Alaska’s promotion of its economic relationship with China 
because the anti-commandeering doctrine protects state sovereignty, of 
which regulation is only one part. 
Relatedly, the Supreme Court has approved federal regulation of 
state governments where those governments are regulated in the same 
manner as private parties.219 Private businesses, too, conduct trade 
missions, open offices overseas, promote their exports and tourism, and 
solicit foreign direct investment. As already stated, however, the Alaska 
state government represents its citizens in its capacity as sovereign when 
promoting its economic relationship with China. The anti-
commandeering doctrine thus protects Alaska’s promotion of its 
economic relationship with China as part of Alaska’s sovereignty under 
the Constitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As globalization proceeds apace, Alaska finds itself caught between 
two superpowers. While Alaska seeks to expand its economic 
relationship with China, the U.S. federal government seeks to prevail in a 
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trade war and to ensure its national security against increasing Chinese 
economic espionage. So far, the U.S. federal government has not 
attempted to drag Alaska directly into its foreign policy by prohibiting 
Alaska from promoting its economic relationship with China. As relations 
between the U.S. federal government and China sour, however, Alaska’s 
economic vitality increasingly hangs in the balance. 
It is, therefore, more important than ever for Alaska to be prepared 
to defend its sovereign prerogative to advance the welfare of its citizens 
through foreign economic engagement, as the New England states did 
during the embargo of 1807. While Alaska cannot stop the federal 
government from regulating foreign commerce itself, Alaska can ensure, 
through the anti-commandeering doctrine, that political accountability is 
properly apportioned under the constitutional structure of dual 
sovereignty and that the correct political actor is held responsible for any 
economic fallout from the regulation of foreign commerce. The anti-
commandeering doctrine would thus be the proper approach for 
resolving this conflict between Alaska and the U.S. federal government, 
as the conflict would go to the heart of the constitutional boundary 
between sovereignties enforced through the anti-commandeering 
doctrine. 
 
